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IN THE SU:"'REME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROSE 0. SWEDIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vsTHORSTEN FRED

Case No. 16003

St~DIN,

Defendant-Appellant.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEI1ENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought an order to show cause against
defendant seeking, among other claims, to recover for alleged
arrearages on the mortgage obligation on real property awarded
to plaintiff pursuant to the Decree of Divorce.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff for
the alleged arrearages in an undetermined amount.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment and
order entered against defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 25, 1978 plaintiff served defendant
with an order to show cause and petition for modification,
including therein a claim against defendant for alleged
arrearages as to the mortgage obligation on real property
awarded to plaintiff in a Decree of Divorce entered on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

April 21, 1976.
Said claim for arrearages had already been dismissed with prejudice and on the merits pursuant to an
order signed on February 25, 1978 by the Honorable David K.
Winder.

(R. 33-39)
On March 3, 1978 defendant's attorney filed a

motion to refer the above matter to the Honorable David K.
Winder, claiming that the points asserted by plaintiff
were the same as those already heard and decided by said
Judge.

Further, defendant claimed that plaintiff's petition

constituted an attempt at a rehearing of the same issues.
(R. 55-56)
At the hearins on plaintiff's order to show cause
held on March 9, 1978, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor denied
defendant's motion for referral.

The court granted judgment

for plaintiff against the defendant on said alleged arrearages, leaving the amount of said judgment open for proof at
a later time.

An amended judgment and order reflecting

such was signed on July 25, 1978.

(R. 91-93)

On August 10, 1978 defendant filed a Notice of
Appeal from said amended judgment and order.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LO>'i'ER COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR REFERRAL AND IN GRAl\ITING JUDG~ffiNT FOR PLAINTIFF ON THE CLAI~D ARREARAGES
Section 78-7-19, Utah Code Annotated (1953)
prohibits repeated applications for the same order.

Said
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statute reads as follows:
If an application for an order,
made to a judge of a court in
which the action or proceedincr
is pending, is refused in whole
or in part, or is granted conditionally, no subsequent application for the same order can be
made to any other judge, except
of a higher court; but nothing
in this section applies to motions
refused for any informality in the
papers or proceeding necessary to
obtain the order, or to motions
refused with liberty to renew the
same.
As an indication of the seriousness of the prohibition against repeated applications, the legislature provided
that violations of the above statute may be punished as a
contempt.

§78-7-20, Utah Code Annotated (1953)
The policy underlying these statutory provisions

is sound.

In the interest of preserving judicial order and

promoting certainty, multiple applications for the same
relief should be limited to circumstances involving mere
procedural defects or where leave is granted to renew a
motion.
In the instant case, the claim brought by plaintiff
concerning alleged arrearages on mortgage obligations on
property awarded to plaintiff was identical to the claim
already dismissed with prejudice by the Honorable David K.
Winder in a prior hearing.

Following is a portion of the

transcript of that hearing held on February 11, 1977:
MR. ALLRED: Before \ve cret into
that, May I at least inquire.
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I think there are three things
in the Petition.
One is a
modification of the Decree to
require payment on an obligation
on which the plaintiff now owes,
and I don't think I heard Mr.-MR. THURBER:
limit this.

\•Je are going to

THE COURT: You are going to waive
that particular claim?
MR. THURBER:

For the present.

THE COURT: That is, as I understand, his mother is owed an
obligation out of a property that
was awarded to her and you are dropping
that claim.
Is that correct?
l'!R. THURBER: Yes. v·Je are not going
to argue that at this time.
MR. ALLRED: May we include that in
the order that the Court will deny
that aspect of relief?
THE COURT:
If you are not pursuing it,
the order will be that this is dismissed
with prejudice. (Reporter's p a r t i a l - transcript, p. 2, emphasis added)
The order signed by the court on February 25, 1977
included a provision dismissing plaintiff's claim with
prejudice and on the merits.

(R. p. 39, paragraph 4).

Counsel for plaintiff did not object to said provision nor
was the order appealed from.
Despite this prior ruling on the same issue by a
different judge, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor denied defendant's
motion for referral and, further, granted judgment on said
claim for plaintiff against defendant.

Appellant contends

that clearly the court erred in so doing.
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The case of In Re: Estate of Mecham, 537 P.2d 312,
(1975), concerned the question of one judge vacating the
order of a different judge of the same court.

In Mecham,

the administrator of the estate filed an accounting and
petition for distribution and discharge.

At a hearing on

the matter, the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson denied the
petition with leave to amend.

Subsequently, the administrator

filed a supplemental accounting and his attorney obtained
an ex parte order approving the accounting and granting final
distribution and discharge.

Five days later, the heirs filed

objections to the accounting and requested that the matter be
set for trial.
Subsequently, the administrator's attorney filed
a motion to strike the objections and noticed it for hearing.
Counsel for the objectors failed to appear at said hearing,
claiming he was not aware of the hearing because the notice
pertaining thereto had been buried near the end of the motion
to strike, a document amounting to some thirty-nine pages.
Therefore, counsel for the objectors filed a motion
to vacate the judgment in favor of the administrator and,
upon inquiring of Judge Jeppson, the matter was ordered placed
on the law and motion calendar, where it could be properly
heard by any other judge of the same court.
At the hearing on the motion to vacate Judge
Jeppson's order, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor vacated Judge
Jeppson's order striking the objectors' exceptions and
ordered that a hearing on the merits should be held concerning
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
-5-OCR, may contain errors.

the objections to the petition for distribution and
discharge.

No motion was made by counsel for the adminis-

trator to rescind or modify said order, nor was it appealed
from.
At the hearing on the objections to the accounting,
the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr. held that Judge Taylor's
vacating of Judge Jeppson's previous order approving the
accounting '\Y"as in error, and on his own motion dismissed the
objections.
The Supreme Court of Utah, in vacating and remanding,
held that Judge Taylor's order was proper in that Judge
Jeppson had directed that the matter be placed on the general
law and motion calendar.

However, as to Judge Hanson's order,

the Court held that he had improperly overruled Judge Taylor's
order.

The Court stated:
~~ile

in normal procedure and protocol
this motion would have come up before
Judge Jeppson, when he directed that
it be placed on the general law and
motion calendar, anyjudge of the court
had jurisdiction to act in the matter.
Hhen Judge Taylor did so, and his
order was not changed or appealed
from, it became the effective order
in the case. However, what happened
with respect to Judge Hanson's order,
entered 19 months later, was entirely
different.
It was attacked by a
proper and timely motion for a new
trial; and that failing, by this
appeal.
Accepting and applying the rule
stated above, that one district
judge of concurrent jurisdiction
cannot act as an appellate judge
and reverse the rulina of another,
precludes
Judge
from
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vacating the order of Judge Taylor.
537 P.2d at 314.
The case at bar involves precisely the same
type of situation.

No attempt was made to modify or vacate

Judge Winder's prior order, nor did plaintiff attempt to
appeal therefrom.

Consequently, that order became final

as to the same claim raised by plaintiff in the later hearing
before Judge Taylor.

Under the rationale of Mecham, Judge

Taylor erred in first denying defendant's motion for referral
and then, in vacating Judge Winder's order and granting judgment for plaintiff on the claimed arrearages.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT
ON A CLAIH T'lliiCH HAD NOT YET ~1ATURED
If Judge Taylor's actions in granting judgment for
plaintiff were held not to be error despite Judge vlinder' s
prior ruling, appellant contends that the lmver court inproperly
granted judgment on the claimed arrearages.

The evidence pre-

sented against defendant consisted solely of plaintiff's
affidavit and testimony concerning alleged claims against
her by the mortgage obligee.
testimony was introduced.

No corroborating evidence or

Further, no action against

plaintiff for such alleged arrearages had yet been brought
by the mortgage obligee.
Consequently, judgment was granted on the basis
of unsupported hearsay evidence.

This fact was reflected

in the amended judgment and order in that a determination
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for further hearing if and when an action for said arrearages
was filed against the plaintiff.
Appellant contends that judgment was granted
prematurely on a claim not proven to be in existence at the
time the judgment was rendered.
CONCLUSION

Appellant, on the basis of the foregoing, respectfully requests this court to reverse the judgment of the
lower court and remand the matter for the purpose of vacating
the judgnent and order against the defendant on the basis
that the claims involved therein were already decided in
appellant's favor by a
DATED

diff~t

this~day

judge.

of December, 1978.
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